Where is the Arab Lobby?

But this mindset is wrong. American politics boils down to two things: votes and money. In reality the largest detriment to Arab and Muslim Americans, and our families and friends in our countries of origin, is the lack of an organized, articulate, and dedicated lobby in the United States. Practically every political candidate’s agenda is primarily driven by votes. Votes lead to victory. Money comes into the picture because the more money candidates raise, the easier it is for them to advertise on television and radio, send direct mail literature to potential voters, and organize their supporters for election day. The name of the game is heavy fund-raising and high voter turnout. Thus groups like Arab and Muslim Americans can potentially have a significant impact in the election process. According to the Arab American Institute, there are 3.5 million Americans of Arab descent. And while the number of Muslims is more difficult to track, it is estimated that there are between 2 and 6 million Muslims in the United States. In addition, being one of the more affluent minority groups in the United States allows Arabs and Muslims to have an impact on political contributions.

There are organizations and institutes active in the United States, which advocate for issues that are important to Arab and Muslim Americans, such as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Arab American Institute (AAI), and the American Muslim Taskforce (AMT). Lobby groups vary in their overall purpose. Some groups lobby for certain issues and viewpoints without supporting individual candidates, while other organizations form political action committees, which contribute money to candidates and give formal endorsements so their members will vote for those candidates. However, these organizations have not been successful in channeling Arab and Muslim resources during elections in a concerted, organized way. There are a variety of reasons for this, the most noteworthy being that there is complacency within the communities themselves. In addition, for those who are active in the political process there is a lack of long term vision as to the means of establishing a strong lobby, the issues the lobby should address, and what would be considered acceptable results.

Before the tragedy of 9/11 the Arab and Muslim American lobby was dismal. Since then, more and more people have become engaged in the political process, realizing that potential influence can be created within the corridors of power. However, there is still much work to be done. Compared to other special interest groups in the United States, Arab and Muslim Americans contribute less money to candidates, have less representation on Capital Hill, and have a poorly organized vote. Just to offer comparison, Opensecrets.org reported in 2002 that from the 1989-1990 election cycle to the 2002 cycle, pro-Israel interest groups contributed US$41.3 million to federal candidates and party committees. In comparison, during the same time period pro-Arab groups contributed US$297,000. The pro-Israel lobby is considered to be a fairly strong lobby in the United States, thus it is apparent that the Arab and Muslim lobby is not even on the radar. Another example a of strong ethnic lobby is the Cuban-American lobby, which uses its strong voting power in South Florida to influence United States policy towards Cuba.

The toughest hurdle to overcome in strengthening the Arab and Muslim lobby is convincing members of these communities that they can make a difference. Most are convinced that they cannot make a difference because other special interest groups, which have agendas opposed to that of the Arabs and Muslims, are too strong. Furthermore, many set their expectations to high, expecting overnight success in what is a long term process. Others just don’t care. There is a saying in American politics that “All politics is local.” This is a key concept that Arabs and Muslims have failed to recognize. The premise of this saying is that what really matters is politics at the local level because local politics is essentially what impacts the people’s day to day lives. Supporting city council members, county commissioners, state legislators, and the mayors of our cities can yield more tangible results than raising money for Hillary Clinton or Rudy Giuliani. Yet Arab and Muslim Americans are seldom interested in supporting these local politicians because they generally have low name recognition and have little to no impact on foreign policy issues.

This outlook is fails us firstly because Arabs and Muslims should focus our resources on supporting candidates who will be the future leaders of America, and these future leaders generally start as local public officials. But beyond this, Arabs and Muslims must understand that our lobby is starting from a position of weakness. We must first focus on local issues that affect the everyday lives of our communities and then work our way up to national and international issues.

It is much easier to build a strong relationship with local candidates than with established national figures, who are beholden to more interest groups and agendas.

This is especially true in the money game where candidates like Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Rudy Giuliani can raise millions of dollars with the snap of their fingers. If Arab and Muslim Americans raise US$25,000 for these candidates, it will not make a huge difference because these candidates have enough money. But if we raise the same amount and contribute the money evenly over four or five local candidates, we will build strong ties to people who will remember the resources they received from Arab and Muslim Americans.

Working with local candidates means that the Arab and Muslim lobby should start with local issues that we can use to build consensus with the American public before focusing on foreign policy. Working on issues such as the economy, healthcare, education, and civil rights is a positive entry point to then work on other issues such as foreign policy. The communities need to get their foot in the door by focusing on other issues first. Currently, it will be nearly impossible to make major progress on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Iraq, and other issues affecting the Muslim world because there are larger, more experienced, and better known interest groups already at play in Washington, with which the Arab and Muslim lobby cannot compete yet. This is not to say that foreign policy should be ignored, but it should not be the sole focus of the Arab and Muslim lobby.

This leads to another problem: what I call “snapshot activists.” These are activists who are engaged in the political process but will only support high level candidates with high name recognition, so they can snap a picture with them and put it on their wall for friends and family to see. These activists readily contribute thousands of dollars to the big name politicians, but will not give a penny to local candidates. But what does that really accomplish for the Arab and Muslim agenda? When the communities support candidates we should be able to hold them to realistic policy goals toward the Arab and Muslim communities rather than being satisfied with just a photo opportunity.

The final piece of the puzzle is for Arabs and Muslims to work with other groups who have been through a similar struggle and have parallel interests. Communities such as African Americans and Hispanics are natural political allies to Arabs and Muslims, and we must reach out to them. Arabs and Muslims can learn from these groups and work together with them on common objectives. We must realize that we cannot do this on our own and must reach out to other communities with similar interests in domestic and foreign policy.

The bottom line is that this is a tough process that will not yield results overnight. It is a process will take at least ten to fifteen years to achieve tangible results. Arab and Muslim Americans need to wake up and get involved. Creating change takes courage, leadership, and perseverance. Complacency is not an option.